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Blockchain’s Treacherous Vocabulary:
One More Challenge for Regulators
By Angela Walch

I

n February 2017, the Arizona state legislature
passed a statute that was celebrated by the blockchain community as a sign that regulators were
finally getting it.1 The statute allows signatures
“secured through a blockchain” to be treated as
“electronic signatures”2 and enables the use of
blockchain-powered smart contracts in commerce.3
Crucially, the statute defines “blockchain technology” as “distributed ledger technology that uses a
distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated
ledger, which may be public or private, permissioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized
crypto economics or tokenless.” It further provides
that “[t]he data on the ledger is protected with cryptography, is immutable and auditable and provides an
uncensored truth.”4
What a mess. Instead of celebrating, we should
be lamenting this legislation as woefully uninformed
and creating more problems than it solves. Focusing
merely on the statute’s definition of “blockchain
technology,” numerous problems become evident.
First, rather than being an inherent characteristic,
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“immutability” of blockchain records is a matter of
debate,5 as high-profile events in the blockchain
space have shown that blockchain records are
changeable at will by the people who comprise
the blockchain system,6 and it currently is unclear
which variations of blockchain technology actually
create a record that even approaches immutability.7
Simply stating in a statute that “data on the
ledger is … immutable” does not actually make data
immutable. This raises complicated questions. Do
the legislators intend for data on a blockchain to
be treated as if it is immutable, even if real-world
events already have shown that it is not? (Think
Continued on page 10
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back to the July 2016 Ethereum hard fork when the
blockchain record was rewritten to recover funds
stolen from the hacked DAO.)8 Or are they using
the word “immutable” to mean something other than
its normal meaning of “unchangeable,” but just not
being explicit about it? What if public and private
blockchains actually differ in their ability to create
“immutable” records (which is one position in the
technology debate),9 but the statute states that both
types do?
Second, the statute states that “the data on the
ledger … provides an uncensored truth.”10 Again,
this is a vast overstatement of the technology’s
capabilities, as the truth of any data appearing on a
blockchain ledger (other than perhaps the transfer
of the native token itself) is limited by the quality or
truth of the data entered on the ledger. If a false piece
of data is put on a blockchain ledger, it remains false,
regardless of the fact that it appears on the ledger
(the garbage in/garbage out idea). The “uncensored
truth” language in the statute echoes the lingo of the
cypherpunk and crypto-anarchist groups that Bitcoin
emerged from, and is bizarrely political and out-ofplace in a statute. The language raises similar issues
to the use of “immutable” in the statute, as it suggests
that data on a blockchain ledger is true even if it isn’t.
Does that mean we should treat demonstrably false
data as true, just because it appears in a blockchain
record? How would that make sense?
Even this cursory analysis of the Arizona statute’s
definition of blockchain technology demonstrates
that big problems can be created by legislating without an understanding of the relevant subject matter.
Worryingly, the issues with the Arizona statute reflect
a poor comprehension of blockchain technology and
a failure to critically analyze the subject by the legislature and the governor who signed the statute into law.
With regulators and policy makers around the world
grappling with how to handle the much-hyped technology, the Arizona statute provides just one example
of how things can go wrong, particularly when regulators do not carefully scrutinize the technological
jargon they use. With numerous influential people
touting blockchain technology as revolutionary for
countless important social systems, from voting, to
property records, to finance, it is critical for regulators
10
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and policy makers to get it right, even more so as
government policy makers consider implementing
the technology in their own consequential systems.
With Arizona’s problematic statute as backdrop,
this essay focuses on the fast-moving, contested,
and often confusing language around blockchain
technology, and the challenges this terminology
muddle raises for regulators. After illuminating the
language problems and their significance, I suggest
ways that regulators can overcome the confusion
and misunderstanding so easily generated by blockchain technology’s unsettled vocabulary. In order for
regulators, policy makers, and potential adopters to
make the best decisions about blockchain technology, they must understand its actual characteristics,
capabilities, and risks. Penetrating the language barriers around blockchain technology is essential to gaining this understanding, and therefore to responsibly
and effectively use the technology. Moreover, actions
such as those of the Arizona legislature demonstrate
that there is no time to waste in the education process.

THE BLOCKCHAIN
VO C A B U L A RY VO RT E X
As blockchain technology has gained attention
from the financial sector and others, its vocabulary
has rapidly grown and changed. Copious jargon is
used in the field, often imprecisely. Many different terms are somewhat overlapping, increasing the
confusion. For example, “blockchain technology”
also is referred to as “distributed ledger technology”
or “DLT” or “shared ledger technology” or “SLT” or
a “distributed database.” There is an emerging sense
that blockchain technology is a subcategory of DLT,
but that is not yet resolved. Other examples of terminology problems include inconsistency in referring
to the record generated by blockchain technology as
“tamper-proof” versus “tamper-evident” or “tamperresistant.” Each of these presumably means something
very different about the reliability or robustness of
the blockchain record, yet the terms often seem to
be used indiscriminately. Numerous other examples
of contested terms abound (e.g., immutable, trustless,
decentralized), as I explore more deeply in a lengthier
forthcoming article,11 and awareness of the terminology problems within the blockchain ecosystem is
growing, as evidenced by numerous articles seeking
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to provide definitions of contested terms,12 and efforts
by international organizations to begin to standardize
the terminology.13
Language in general is always on the move, but
is particularly fluid around a fast-moving innovation
such as blockchain technology. As the technology
is tweaked, new terms are created to distinguish the
new version from the old, as has occurred with the
creation of the terms “permissionless” and “permissioned” blockchains to distinguish the original open
blockchains such as Bitcoin from new ones that have
a limited and known set of transaction processors in
the network. Further, new terms are introduced as the
original ones are rethought, perhaps as understanding
of the technology’s capabilities shifts. For example,
a blockchain record generally has been described as
“tamper-proof,” an extremely bold claim suggesting it
is impossible to alter; it is becoming more common,
however, to see it described as “tamper-evident” or
“tamper-resistant,” which are more modest claims
about the record’s strength.
Blockchain technology’s terminology also has
shifted for marketing, or commercial purposes. For
instance, when Bitcoin became associated with the
criminal underworld of money laundering and the
illegal goods marketplace Silk Road, people began
talking about the potential offered by “blockchain
technology” rather than Bitcoin itself, and a number
of companies with “Bit” in their names changed them
to escape the Bitcoin taint.14 Finally, the interdisciplinary nature of blockchain technology has contributed to vocabulary problems, as numerous fields
(e.g., cryptography, computer science, economics,
etc.) have brought their own jargon to the discussion,
making communication more confused.

R E G U L ATO RY C H A L L E N G E S
Despite nascent standardization efforts, the difficulties with language remain, and are highly problematic for regulators and others seeking to learn
about blockchain technology. Language barriers make
it difficult for regulators to pin down the facts about
the technology and to distinguish between different
variations of the technology. Further, the confused
language around the technology increases the potential for regulatory capture, as well as the potential for
inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions. All of
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these challenges make it more likely for regulators to
make flawed decisions about the technology, undermining their effectiveness in protecting consumers
and in maintaining financial and social stability.
Below, I discuss each of these challenges in turn.
First, the inconsistent, confusing, and sometimes
misleading vocabulary around blockchain technology
can make it difficult for regulators to get a handle
on the “facts” about the technology.15 For example,
how robust is the record created by the technology?
Is it impossible to change or tamper with, or just really
hard but possible? Is the need to trust other people in
a blockchain network actually eliminated through the
use of the technology (making it “trustless”), or is
trust just displaced to other parties? Does the use of
blockchain technology to create a record make the
data on the record more likely to be true, or does
the reliability of the record ultimately depend on
the quality of the data entered? Arriving at accurate
answers to these questions is critical in understanding
the technology’s true capabilities and risk profile. It
should go without saying that the better the regulator
understands the subject matter, the better decisions
he or she can make, whether in deciding the details
and scope of regulation, or in deciding not to regulate
at all.
Second, the muddled language around blockchain technology makes it difficult to distinguish
between variations of the technology, complicating
regulators’ risk assessment process. Multiple variations of blockchain technology now exist, with each
having different capabilities and risks. It is common,
however, for all variations to be referred to as “blockchain technology,” and to describe the entire diverse
mix as having the same fundamental characteristics of
immutability, security, and trustlessness. This makes
it hard for regulators to grasp the true risk profile of
a given form of blockchain technology, which means
that their decisions related to the technology may be
ill-informed. For example, should blockchains that
use different consensus mechanisms to agree on the
state of the blockchain record be treated the same
or differently from a regulatory perspective? What
about public versus private blockchains? A confused
terminology makes these types of question more difficult to answer.
Third, the language haze can contribute to other
problems for regulators, including increasing the
chance of regulatory capture and all of the negative
11
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effects that brings. “[R]egulatory capture occurs when
bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve
some notion of a wider collective public interest and
begin to systematically favor specific vested interests, usually the very interests they were supposed to
regulate and restrain for the wider public interest.”16
Regulatory capture is made more likely for blockchain technology because the confused vocabulary
can increase regulators’ dependence on blockchain
industry experts to explain the technology to them.
Of course, consulting with industry experts is essential to understand the facts well enough to make good
regulatory decisions.
However, with blockchain technology, the terminology problems can make it easier for proponents
of the technology to overstate the capabilities and
benefits of the technology, while understating the risks
and potential downsides. This is compounded by the
complex, interdisciplinary nature of blockchain technology, which may make regulators less likely to interrogate industry’s claims about the technology, as they
may feel out of their depth. Worryingly, blockchain
technology’s opaque complexity mirrors that of the
complicated financial products and risk models that
contributed to the Financial Crisis. As regulators were
“daunted by the complexity posed by the new financial
instruments and awed by the promise of new financial
engineering to shift and spread risk efficiently,”17 they
failed to understand the true risk profile of these financial creations. There is potential for similar deference
by regulators towards blockchain technology.
Moreover, the potential for regulatory capture is
further increased with blockchain technology because
of the high number of prominent former regulators
and well-respected businesspeople who are working
for blockchain technology companies or serving as
advisors or board members to them.18 This means that
regulators may have personal relationships with the
people who are explaining the technology to them,
or may be influenced by the reputation or prestige of
the person associated with the technology. The strong
possibility for “cognitive capture” or “cultural capture”
of regulators by the blockchain technology industry
increases the likelihood that misunderstandings about
the technology (willfully or innocently introduced)
will shape regulatory and policy decisions about it.19
Fourth, the unclear vocabulary around blockchain technology could lead to inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions. Striking differences in
12

August

2017

regulation could emerge across jurisdictions due to
differing understandings of the capabilities and risks
of the technology, even if regulators have aligning
policy objectives. For instance, if one jurisdiction
(such as Arizona) understands that a record created
through blockchain technology (of whatever variation) is “immutable” and inevitably reflects “truth,”
then that jurisdiction may choose to give a blockchain record privileged status for evidentiary purposes. A jurisdiction that understands a blockchain
record to be difficult but not impossible to alter, and
the “truth” of the information stored on the record to
be limited by the quality or truth of the information
put into the record, may treat blockchain records
the same as any other record under evidentiary rules.
Both jurisdictions may have the same policy goal of
structuring their rules of evidence to permit reliable
information to be introduced in a case, but could wind
up with wildly divergent treatment of the records, and
potentially differing outcomes for a single set of facts.
Analogous inconsistencies in regulation could
arise in other regulatory domains, including in setting
reporting or disclosure obligations, standards for fraud,
or multiple other possibilities. Inconsistent regulation
can lead to forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage,
as parties search for the most attractive legal regime.
Further, diverging regulation can increase compliance
costs for parties operating across multiple jurisdictions, as is likely for blockchain technology with its
effortless spanning of borders.
As this brief discussion makes clear, the vocabulary problems around blockchain technology can
generate serious consequences, making it crucial for
regulators and others seeking to understand the technology to be acutely alert to the presence of language
issues, and to utilize the critical approach to the technology that I recommend below.

P E N E T R AT I N G T H E L A N G UAG E
BARRIER
What can regulators and others seeking to understand blockchain technology do to fight through the
language barrier surrounding it? Simply being aware
that blockchain vocabulary is treacherous can help,
as can a critical approach to the learning process.
Presumably this is the approach everyone already
takes when learning about a new topic, but sometimes
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a reminder of these basic principles is worthwhile.
As the Financial Crisis made clear, we often either
assume we understand something well, or pretend to
understand something well, when the reality is that
we have failed to perceive critical facts and implications of a given subject. In this section, therefore, I
highlight the mindset and learning strategies that can
help regulators and others achieve a more accurate
and nuanced understanding of blockchain technology’s risks and benefits.

INTERROGATE HYPE
Hype about blockchain technology is rampant,
with many making grand claims about its ability to
solve vexing human problems such as financial inclusion, corrupt governments, delays to settlement of
transactions, and many more. Unfortunately, blockchain’s language problems can make it more difficult
to distinguish hype from reality. For instance, it is
common to see references to “the blockchain” or just
“blockchain” when people describe the benefits of
the technology, which is problematic given the vast
differences in features among different forms of the
technology. Grouping all variations of the technology
under the label “blockchain” can lead to major misunderstandings about each variant’s risks and capabilities, and regulators must be alert to this potential
as they work to grasp the truth about the technology.

BE SKEPTICAL OF EVERYONE
AND EVERY FORUM
“Fake news” is everywhere in the blockchain
technology space, and can even show up in reputable
sources, often cloaked in terminology problems. For
example, a number of sources in reputable fora have
stated that Estonia used blockchain technology in its
national digital identity system,20 but Estonian officials
and historic records indicate this is untrue.21 Further,
I and others have questioned the appropriateness of
the term “immutable” to describe a record created by
blockchain technology;22 the term is omnipresent in
blockchain discourse, including in reports and articles
in prestigious publications, making misunderstanding about the technology’s capabilities likely.23 These
types of inaccurate or misleading statements, whose
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inaccuracy can be masked by problematic vocabulary,
can become embedded in the discourse, as an inaccuracy is cited as true again and again.
This means that one cannot assume that a given
forum, whether publication or venue, will provide
accurate information about blockchain technology.
Misleading or inaccurate statements and language
about the technology appear in sources that are
treated as authoritative and reliable by default, often
because of the source’s history or an association with
a prestigious and trusted institution.24 So, skepticism
about claims made regarding blockchain technology
is warranted, regardless of the legitimacy or prestige
of the forum where the claim is made. Regulators
must recognize that traditional markers of legitimacy
are insufficient to assume reliable information about
blockchain technology, and should therefore thoroughly probe every claim.

IDENTIFY AND WEIGH CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
As with any new industry, there is a lot of money
up for grabs in the blockchain technology space, and
regulators must keep in mind that people’s financial
incentives can influence their view of the technology, its potential, and its risks. Much of the education
of regulators and policy makers is being performed
by blockchain industry lobbying organizations, such
as the Digital Chamber of Commerce, the Global
Blockchain Business Council, and the industryfunded think tank and advocacy organization Coin
Center. This does not mean that the information provided by such organizations necessarily is misleading
or wrong, but regulators must be alert to how industry
incentives can impact their input, and weigh how
these conflicts affect the reliability of the information
and recommendations of these groups.
“Everybody’s got an angle”25 in the blockchain
space, from industry players to the numerous and vocal
thought leaders, and regulators must sniff out each
party’s angle and weight its perspective accordingly.

SEEK DIVERSE POINTS OF VIEW
In the last few years, a consensus has rapidly
formed that blockchain technology is a revolutionary
13
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innovation that will transform a wide swath of industries and practices. As the consensus has spread, few
dissenting opinions have been expressed. This quick
agreement means it is likely that there are many critical questions about the technology, its capabilities,
and its risks that have not been answered or even
asked.
Regulators should therefore seek out diverse
perspectives in learning about blockchain technology
to help them to avoid misunderstandings and group
think. This means that they should solicit input from
critics of the technology as well as proponents; from
those who see the benefits and risks of blockchain
technology as great as well as those who see them as
small or somewhere in the middle. They should seek
advice from people from different academic disciplines and business areas, given the extreme interdisciplinarity of blockchain technology. Similarly, other
forms of diversity, including gender, race, economic,
and geographic diversity, can help regulators gain a
more nuanced, complete understanding of the technology. The benefits of a diverse group of decisionmakers are well known,26 and regulators must ensure
that their learnings are as fulsome as possible.

DON’T SKIP ANALYTICAL STEPS (DON’T
ASSUME FOUNDATIONS ARE SOLID)
As mentioned previously, one reason the vocabulary around blockchain technology is so unsettled is
that the technology is evolving so rapidly. Nothing is
settled about blockchain technology, including what
it is, its features, or its flaws. These are the subject
of much experimentation and debate amongst technologists and entrepreneurs in the space. Yet policy
makers and regulators often jump ahead to questions
of the implications of the technology—how can we
use it to solve problems, or prevent it from being
used improperly—and assume that foundational facts
about the technology are settled.
Because both the technology and its vocabulary
are so fluid and immature, regulators must ask questions about everything. Does the technology actually
create immutable records in a secure or trustless
way? How, precisely, does it do this? How does each
variation to the technology, whether in the consensus
mechanism, the permitted validators, or the cryptography selected, alter the capabilities and risks of the
14
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technology? What assumptions are technologists and
businesses making that are left unsaid? What does
every word of jargon mean to the person who uses it?
Any less-thorough inquiry is inadequate, given
the combination of language issues, complexity, and
hype that surround this fast-moving technology.

DON’T BE A LEMMING
Regulators and policy makers face significant
pressures to act in particular ways. They often are
caught in the uncomfortable position of being blamed
for not being innovative enough and killing jobs with
inappropriate regulation, while at the same time, they
are criticized if they inadequately protect consumers or fail to prevent or adequately manage a crisis
(with the Financial Crisis likely a searing memory
for many).
This can make it tempting to just do what other
regulators and policy makers are doing, so that one
can’t be individually blamed down the road for making a bad decision. There are benefits to conformity,
one of which is diffusion of accountability. Herd
behavior, “the phenomenon [in which]…everyone
does what everyone else is doing, even when their
private information suggests doing something quite
different,”27 can manifest among regulators28 as well as
in the adoption of new technologies.29 No one wants
to be seen as restricting innovation or to miss out on
a useful new technology, so when regulators see others contemplating introducing a central bank digital
currency, or using blockchain technology for government processes, they may feel compelled to join in.
Regulators and policy makers need to be willing
to swim against the current until they have investigated blockchain technology thoroughly and have
developed their own, well-founded knowledge about
it. Only then they can make useful regulatory choices
(including decisions not to regulate at all) or decide
whether adoption of the technology is appropriate.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Flawed understandings of blockchain technology
can yield poor regulation and inappropriate adoption
of the technology in critically important systems. It
is crucial that regulators and policy makers actually
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understand what they are grappling with before making regulatory decisions (including whether to regulate at all). The rapidly-changing, contested, and
often misleading vocabulary around blockchain technology makes regulators’ task that much more difficult, as the facts end up buried beneath a muddle of
impenetrable gibberish.
Rather than throwing up their hands, regulators,
policymakers, and those considering adopting the
technology must take a critical, deliberative approach
to learning about blockchain technology, with awareness that language issues can obscure reality and
lead to misunderstandings. With critically important
social systems being vetted for the technology’s use,
and regulators and policy makers taking actions as we
speak, this matter is incredibly urgent, and must be
brought immediately to the attention of blockchain
decision-makers. I close then, dear reader, with a
request: don’t just sit on this information—go out and
spread the word!
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